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Abstract
The new ACM Code of Ethics is a much-needed update, but introduced
changes to a central principle that have not been discussed widely enough.
This commentary aims to contribute to an improvement of the ethical
standards we want computing professionals to aspire to by analyzing how
changes introduced to Principle 1.2, Avoid Harm, affect the Code as a
whole.
The analysis shows that the principle is now internally inconsistent
in structure and externally inconsistent with Principle 2.3. It condones
intentional harm too broadly and does not oblige those responsible to
seek external justification. The existing Principle 2.3 clearly suggests that
Principle 1.2 is unethical.
As a consequence, the change introduced to Principle 1.2 in the new
Code of Ethics nullifies the good intention of the code; counteracts the
many good changes introduced in all three drafts; and places the ACM in
a dangerous moral position.
This short paper explains why and recommends concrete actions.
1 How to Avoid Harm
There has never been a more important time to raise the bar for ethical stan-
dards in computing. This year, the Association of Computing Machinery, the
worlds major association of computing professionals and researchers, updated
its Code of Ethics [cod18], previously updated 1992 [cod16]. As part of this up-
date, multiple drafts were released for comments. Many excellent changes were
introduced to update and strengthen the code and take into account feedback
of the community, and the voluntary leadership, effort and insight of the ACM
Code 2018 team deserve praise from the community. The Code contains crucial
changes to a central principle, however, that weaken the code substantially and
fundamentally beyond the point of usefulness.
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This commentary aims to contribute to a further improvement of the stan-
dards we want computing professionals to aspire to. Let us not wait another 26
years until adapting the code again.
The last of three drafts of the Code of Ethics contained a crucial change to
the central Principle 1.2,’Avoid Harm’. In draft 3, it read as follows.1
1.2 Avoid harm.
In this document, harm means negative consequences to any stake-
holder, especially when those consequences are significant and un-
just. Examples of harm include unjustified physical or mental injury,
unjustified destruction or disclosure of information, and unjustified
damage to property, reputation, and the environment. This list is
not exhaustive.
Well-intended actions, including those that accomplish assigned du-
ties, may lead to harm. When that harm is unintended, those re-
sponsible are obligated to undo or mitigate the harm as much as
possible. Avoiding harm begins with careful consideration of poten-
tial impacts on all those affected by decisions. When harm is an
intentional part of the system, those responsible are obligated to en-
sure that the harm is ethically justified and to minimize unintended
harm.
To minimize the possibility of indirectly harming others, computing
professionals should follow generally accepted best practices. Addi-
tionally, the consequences of emergent systems and data aggregation
should be carefully analyzed. Those involved with pervasive or in-
frastructure systems should also consider Principle 3.7.
A computing professional has an additional obligation to report any
signs of system risks that might result in harm. If leaders do not
act to curtail or mitigate such risks, it may be necessary to blow
the whistle to reduce potential harm. However, capricious or mis-
guided reporting of risks can itself be harmful. Before reporting
risks, a computing professional should thoroughly assess all relevant
aspects.
All this might sound fine, if vague, but a closer look at the text and the recent
changes tells a different story. The principle is now internally inconsistent in
structure, which opens a loophole, and it is externally inconsistent with Principle
2.3. It omits the need to minimize intentional harm; condones intentional harm
very broadly; and does not oblige those responsible to seek external justification.
A footnote clarifies that this central change was introduced at this late stage
primarily to appeal to the weapons industry. According to the existing Principle
2.3, Principle 1.2 should be considered unethical.
1In the final release of the code, paragraph 2 was changed to end with ‘minimize all
harm’ following a Twitter thread posted in June 2018 [Bec18] in which I criticized draft 3 (as
discussed below). It is unclear what caused this change, since the ACM Ethics team did not
respond to the detailed argument I shared with them in July 2018 (a previous version of this
document.)
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Figure 1: Changes to Principle 1.2 (new elements in green)
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As a consequence, the change introduced to Principle 1.2 in the new Code
of Ethics nullifies the good intention of the code; counteracts the many good
changes introduced in all three drafts; and places the ACM in a cdangerous
moral position. This short paper explains why. Figure 1 reproduces the an-
notated document that highlights the change introduced in draft 3 [ACM18].
Below, I explain my concerns one by one.
2 So whats wrong with this?
I will discuss six major concerns over the current phrasing of Principle 1.2.
1. The justification of intentional harm is ill-specified and inconsistent with
the proportionality principle.
2. Principle 2.3 requires us to challenge Principle 1.2 as an unethical rule
with inadequate moral basis.
3. Principle 1.2 misleadingly suggests that internal justification without le-
gitimation is sufficient.
4. The definition of harm in Principle 1.2 is inconsistent with the examples
provided.
5. The concept of best practices used in Principle 1.2 is vague and inadequate.
6. The relationship of ACM to the Weapons Industry requires discussion.
Below, I discuss each concern in turn. For additional context, I urge you to
review the entire Code.
2.1 Intentional harm and the ethical principle of propor-
tionality
Draft 3 of Principle 1.2 introduced a distinction between intentional and un-
intentional harm, designed to expand the Code’s applicability to the military
domain. The idea that harm can be easily divided into intentional and unin-
tentional harm and then ‘divided and conquered’ may be appealing, but does it
have an adequate moral basis? How actionable is this distinction?
The ethical principle of double effect states that ‘Applications of double
effect always presuppose that some kind of proportionality condition has been
satisfied. Traditional formulations of the proportionality condition require
that the value of promoting the good end outweigh the disvalue of the harmful
side effect’ [McI14]. The new draft principle introduces distinctions along the
lines of double effects, but does not address proportionality. Principle 1.2 in
draft 3 required those responsible to minimize unintentional harm, but did not
oblige them to also minimize intentional harm. Consider the effect on three
example scenarios.
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1. Consider a team designing a bomb to end a war and its suffering. Imag-
ine they face a choice between a bomb that would neutralize electronic
equipment and a hydrogen bomb. According to the Principle above, the
responsible agents would have to minimize unintentional harm, but not in-
tentional harm. This would make the hydrogen bomb the more appealing
solution. Of course, other principles, such as 2.3, would suggest otherwise,
but how sensible is any principle that does not require us to minimize all
harm?
2. An example closer to ACM members research is the ethical dilemmas
posed by self-driving cars and potential harm: As self-driving cars cap-
ture the popular imagination, an ongoing conversation and debate focuses
on how decisions to trade off on harm are adjudicated. It is heartening to
see this discussion draw on long standing conversations in ethics around in-
tention and harm, primarily through the trolley problem, (though perhaps
too often [Bog18]). These conversations point to important distinctions
between intentions and outcomes, the role of proportionality in justifying
harm caused through the harm avoided and the problematic nature of
utilitarian measures of harm.
3. More commonplace then: In the process of discussing this document, I and
my colleagues discussed the action of emailing all members of a dormant
community email list we maintain to alert them to the danger this change
poses. This involves minor harm - the annoyance of yet another unsolicited
email - for a greater public good - the wider discussion of an ethics code.
It may also involve unintentional harm of some minor kind, which we
are unable to anticipate. These would be potential side-effects such as a
persons possible irritation about a standpoint they do not share, or the
carbon footprint of emails. The draft Principle 1.2 required us to minimize
these unintentional harms - which we cannot feasibly anticipate - but it did
not require us to minimize the intentional harm: the annoyance caused
by yet another unsolicited email. It seems obvious and commonsense,
though, that we should aim to minimize this annoyance, for example by
taking care to explain the rationale behind the message.
What is the result of the distinction between intentional and uninentational
harm? Harm that is unintentional should be minimized, but this category is
notoriously fraught. Unintentional harm is often unseen harm, unanticipated
harm. Harm that remains invisible cannot possibly be minimized, however.
This must not absolve a computing professional from their responsibility to aim
to identify it!
Proposed Actions: Change the text so that all harm must be minimized.
Clarify the conceptual framework used to distinguish intentions from uninten-
tional outcomes. Discuss the double effect principle, clarify how it is interpreted,
and incorporate proportionality.
The first of these changes was introduced to the released version of the code.
In the final release, paragraph 2 was changed to end with ‘minimize all harm’.
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This was a much-needed change, but it does not address definitional clarity or
proportionality.
2.2 The Code itself suggests Principle 1.2 is unethical.
As the authors of the Code emphasize, the principles of the code should be read
in conjunction, as a whole. While Principle 1.2 applies directly to computing
professionals and their actions, Principle 2.3 applies to rules such as the Code
itself. It is reproduced below (my highlights in bold):
2.3 Know, respect, and apply existing rules pertaining to profes-
sional work.
Rules here includes regional, national, and international laws and
regulations, as well as any policies and procedures of the organiza-
tions to which the professional belongs. Computing professionals
must obey these rules unless there is a compelling ethical justifica-
tion to do otherwise. Rules that are judged unethical should
be challenged. A rule may be unethical when it has an
inadequate moral basis, it is superseded by another rule, or it
causes recognizable harm that could be mitigated through
its violation. A computing professional who decides to violate a
rule because it is unethical, or for any other reason, must consider
potential consequences and accept responsibility for that action.
Principle 2.3 clearly explains that a rule ‘may be unethical when it has
an inadequate moral basis ... or it causes recognizable harm that could be
mitigated through its violation.’ The code’s authors urge us to consider the
code holistically, and Principle 2.3 emphasizes: ‘Rules that are judged unethical
should be challenged.’ My challenge is based on two key arguments.
First, the moral basis of Principle 1.2 is not substantiated adequately at
this point. It now distinguishes between intentional and unintentional harm
(without justifying this conceptual distinction clearly), which points to the eth-
ical principle of double effect. Since there is no mentioning of proportionality
in Principle 1.2, however, the concept cannot be relied in support the justifi-
cation of harm in Principle 1.2 against Principle 2.3. The lack of addressing
proportionality and the lack of clarifying the code’s position with respect to
the difficult question of intentions highlight that the moral basis of Principle is
highly questionable.
More bluntly and immediately, an examination of the examples above re-
veals that by violating Principle 1.2, one could ‘avoid recognizable harm’ easily,
because Principle 2.3 does not discuss justification of harm nor distinguish in-
tentional from unintentional harm. There is no doubt that Principle 1.2 ‘causes
recognizable harm that could be mitigated through its violation’. This renders
it unethical in light of Principle 2.3. As a result, the entire Code of Ethics is
internally contradictory. As Owens stated on the ACM ethics discussion board,
‘if it is to be the requirement that all members adhere to it, the code must be
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free from controversy and enforceable. Looking through this code, it is neither
in its current state.’ [owe18]
Proposed Action: Start a broad and proactive consultation on this subject
and initiate one more revision of the Code with a clear timeline, focused on
Principle 1.2. Involve other disciplines fully.
2.3 Justification and legitimation
When it comes to justifying harm ethically, Principle 1.2 only states those re-
sponsible are obligated to ensure that the harm is ethically justified and to
minimize unintended harm. It does not clarify where legitimacy comes from,
and it does not clarify that justification can ultimately not come from those re-
sponsible themselves. Consider the example of academic research ethics: Once
a minimum threshold of risk is exceeded, a researcher intending to involve par-
ticipants in research involving humans or animals must seek approval from an
Institutional Review Board with legitimated authority on approving the involve-
ment. This justification is based on (1) the principle of proportionality and (2)
the legitimate external authority of a Research Ethics Board. In any case of
whether the threshold is exceeded, the decision lies with the Research Ethics
Board.
These principles are so important because the implications of scientific and
technological work on society can never be justified with purely technical rea-
sons grounded in the research or the technology development alone. It is no
coincidence that the ACM SIGCHI group has an Ethics committee[sig18] that
perform similar functions in the context of ACM. At no point does the current
Principle 1.2 make clear, however, that legitimation must come from somewhere.
Proposed Action: Consider proportionality and the Precautionary Princi-
ple; consider more fully and discuss publicly what other professional associations
(medical, genetic, biological, civil engineering, psychology) have done and how
the case of ACM relates and compares to their effort; clarify that ethical justifi-
cation must in many cases involve external legitimation rather than come from
those responsible. The resulting Principle 1.2 must spell clearly how and by
which principles (such as proportionality) harm can be justified.
2.4 Unjustified harm
All examples given for harm include the term ‘unjustified’, but the definition
does not, and rightfully so: Harm is a ‘negative consequences to any stakeholder’
in Principle 1.2. The examples are a legacy of prior versions of the code, which
did not discuss intentional harm, hence did not need to discuss justification in
detail. The subsequent discussion in Principle 1.2 covers justification, however
inadequately, but all examples duplicate the idea that harm is only harm if it is
not justified. By only listing unjustified outcomes as harm, it becomes too easy
to argue that a specific negative consequence should not be seen as harm at all
because it is justified. But justified by whom according to which standard?
7
Additionally, the phrase ‘especially when those consequences are significant
and unjust’ renders the definitional clause vague: Either something is a nega-
tive consequence or not. Which amount of negative consequence would be the
threshold at an outcome is no longer harm? Milk is not ‘especially’ milk when it
comes from a cow, and harm is no less a negative consequence if the consequence
is relatively mild.
Proposed Action: Justification of harm is and must remain distinct from
the definition of harm as negative consequence. Remove unjustified from all
examples.
2.5 Best practices
The principle says that To minimize the possibility of indirectly harming others,
computing professionals should follow generally accepted best practices. We
should all be aware that following ‘generally accepted best practices’ is not a
high standard. How have any of these practices helped so far to avoid the harm
already done? Should we not all strive to do better, to reflect critically, to learn
and improve those practice?
As the current discussions of the role of Machine Learning algorithms in
reinforcing gender inequality and racial bias demonstrate in abundance, ‘best
practice’ is much too low a bar.
Proposed Action: Computing professionals should critically reflect on
their own practices as well as generally accepted best practice and strive to
improve both. The Code therefore must reflect a fundamental commitment to
critical reflection and constant questioning of what should count as ‘best prac-
tice’ in computing.
2.6 ACM and the weapons industry
The footnote to the annotated draft reveals that the change introduced to Prin-
ciple 1.2 was introduced to ‘make clear that the Code does not prohibit working
in the defense industry’. The term is a euphemism sometimes used to denote the
arms industry or weapons industry [Wik18a]. Regardless of whether we see this
as an instance of Newspeak[Wik18b] or not, it points to an important question:
What position should the code take with respect to human actions that involve
intentional harm, such as the military and associated industries? Computing
research has a long and difficult historical relationship with the military. The
history of the computing industrys involvement with the military is no secret
either[Les18]. The immediate responses by some of the codes authors pointed
to the need to include military personnel under the code. But note that mili-
tary personnel is not part of the arms industry! My personal stance on whether
the code should or should not cover the military is not important. What the
principle now effectively articulates, however, is a different story.
Regardless of whether we approve or oppose of the idea that the code should
apply to military computing personnel, the idea that this should apply to the
manufacturing of killing machines raises the question: What values does
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ACM want to stand for? Does ACM want to be in the ‘business of war’
[goo18]?
Software is not neutral technology and never was, as the history of technol-
ogy has shown over and over again. Sometimes, this lack of neutrality is more
obvious, such as in the case of the military domain. Sometimes, it is less obvi-
ous, as in a classic case of civil engineering [Win80]. Many recent cases illustrate
the role of algorithms in reinforcing bias ([Nob18, O’N17, Eub18, Reu18]). The
recent protest of Google employees against a project with the Pentagon, and
a similar protest of Microsoft employees about the company’s work with ICE,
reminds us that computing professionals can take a stand. Both cases resulted
in the company withdrawing from those involvements. Does ACM as an organi-
zation want to fall behind the personal standard of those Google and Microsoft
employees? Does ACM want to be forced to examine its ties with the military,
as the American Psychological Association needed to do when its involvement
with torture became public? The principles embodied in this Code exemplify
and express the values that ACM stands for. They are not neutral, and neither
can ACM be ‘neutral’. In technology design, these values become facts:
‘Values are the facts of the future. Values are not the opposite
of facts, subjective desires with no basis in reality. Values express
aspects of reality that have not yet been incorporated into the taken
for granted technical environment. That environment was shaped by
the values that presided over its creation. Technologies are the crys-
tallized expression of those values. New values open up established
designs for revision.[Fee10]
Proposed Action: The ACM leadership needs to clarify where ACM stands
to enable ACM members to take their own decisions about whether they can
identify with the values the organization embodies.
3 Conclusions: After the Code is before the
Code
The discussion above shows that despite best intentions, the Principle 1.2 is
left in need of serious revisions. Principle 1.2 suggests that internal justifica-
tion without legitimation is sufficient, but it is not. The definition of harm
in Principle 1.2 is inconsistent with the examples provided. The justification
of intentional harm that it articulates is ill-specified and inconsistent with the
proportionality principle, and as a consequence, Principle 2.3 requires us to chal-
lenge Principle 1.2 as an unethical rule with inadequate moral basis. In addition,
the concept of ‘best practices’ used in Principle 1.2 is vague and inadequate.
As a result, Principle 1.2 in the new Code of Ethics nullifies the good in-
tention of the code and places ACM in a dangerous moral position. This is
exemplified by the relationship of ACM to the Weapons Industry, which re-
quires discussion. This will be a difficult conversation, but can it be avoided? It
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appears to me, however, that the question and discussion around including the
military has distracted from the massive implications that the current draft has
on any technological effect, and how it provides a license to justify for oneself
unethical computing designs with no need to seek justification externally.
The suggestion that computing should continue to justify its own conse-
quences without recourse to legitimate processes of justification is a terrifying
prospect. The strengthening of the Code cannot wait until ACM has clarified
its position with respect to military computing, and the key weaknesses that
were opened up by the changes to Principle 1.2 can be addressed independently.
After the Code is before the Code. I urge ACM to open a new revision
process right now.
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